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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the 
premier center for health law, scholarship and policy.  Housed at Georgetown University Law 
Center, in the heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative 
solutions for the leading health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic 
diseases to health care financing and health systems.  The Institute, a joint project of the Law 
Center and School of Nursing and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable 
intellectual resources, including the School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics. 
 
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has 
been, and will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global, 
national, and local communities.  By contributing to a more powerful and deeper 
understanding of the multiple ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill 
Institute hopes to advance scholarship, research, and teaching that will encourage key decision-
makers in the public, private, and civil society sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for 
enabling more people in the United States and throughout the world to lead healthier lives. 
 
 Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon 
their graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys, 
physicians, nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many 
other private, public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor.  The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare 
graduates to engage in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care 
law and policy and to rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural, 
economic, scientific, and ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems. 
 
 Scholarship.  O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems, 
using a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond 
a narrow vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a 
scientific endeavor.   
 
 Reflective Problem-Solving.  For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes 
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between 
key policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent 
and knowledge that resides in academia. 
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OVERVIEW 
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM 
 
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern.  In order 
to address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President 
Obama and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health 
reform.  In any debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management, 
economic, and legal issues is likely to be raised.  Due to the diverse interests involved, these 
issues could lead to a series of high-stakes policy debates.  Therefore, it is critical that 
advocates of reform strategies anticipate such issues in order to decrease the likelihood that 
legally resolvable questions become barriers to substantive health reform.  In an effort to 
frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate, the 
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University and the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” project.  
 
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may 
arise in any upcoming federal health reform debate.  While other academic and research 
organizations are exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health 
reform, the O’Neill Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health 
reform.  The target audience includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key 
executive and legislative branch agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other 
key players.  This project attempts to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation 
by providing stakeholders a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health 
reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES  
 
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are recurring questions that are policy-
based and those that are legally-based.  Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and 
cannot be considered in isolation.  However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the 
distinction between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or 
prohibition.   
 
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of 
health reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for 
poverty level subsidies and cost-sharing for preventive services.  In contrast, legal issues are 
those involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution 
allows a certain congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict. 
 
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as 
those beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning 
with, “Can we…?”  The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular 
categories: 1) “Under the Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and 
regulations, can we now…?”; 3) “ Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?”  This 
final set of questions tends to be mixed questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.   
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PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT 
 
This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat 
of political debate.  This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems 
addressed are either soluble or avoidable.  Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a 
constructive activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.  
Consequently, it does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is 
it an attempt to provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.  
Furthermore, this project does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or 
make recommendations among them.  Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide 
policy makers, attorneys, and other key stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal 
issues relating to health reform and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available for 
resolving those questions.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES 
 
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press, 
and current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal 
health reform.  After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of 
over 50 legal issues was narrowed to ten.  An initial framing paper was drafted which identified 
these ten legal issues and briefly outlined the main components of each.  In May of 2008, a 
bipartisan consultation session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and 
framing of the legal issues.  The attendees of the consultation session included congressional 
staff, executive branch officials, advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide 
range of interests affected by health reform.  Feedback and analysis from this session further 
narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current 
law.   
 
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant 
reform proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made.  There are 
multiple other legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is 
adopted, the system changes.  In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for 
an immediate discussion of federal health reform.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
Health insurance exchanges (HIE) are entities that organize the market for health insurance by 
connecting small businesses and individuals into larger pools that spread the risk for insurance 
companies, while facilitating the availability, choice and purchase of private health insurance for 
the uninsured.  While there are legal issues that warrant consideration under a federal, state, or 
private exchange framework, those issues are not insurmountable barriers to implementation.   
 
The section below outlines the legal issues and solutions for a health insurance exchange if 
administered through the federal or state government or through a private entity. 
 
FEDERAL EXCHANGES: Congress has the power to implement an HIE at the federal level, 
but must consider certain laws and regulations during both design and implementation as 
outlined below: 
 
 Interstate Commerce: The federal government has the authority to regulate matters that 
substantially affect interstate commerce. While the power to regulate interstate commerce 
is not unbounded, the power certainly extends to insurance regulation.  
 Tax and Spending: The federal government can tax and spend for the general welfare of 
citizens, thus Congress could use tax incentives and its spending power to incentivize 
participation in a federal exchange or to develop a “play or pay” framework with the 
states.  
 McCarran Ferguson Act: Congress specifically delegated the regulation of insurance to 
the states. Therefore, Congress must clearly and explicitly communicate its intention to 
preempt state regulation of insurance in any insurance regulation it legislates. 
 Anti-commandeering: The federal government is prohibited from appropriating state 
officials to implement federal laws. Therefore, a federal HIE must not require 
implementation by state employees. 
 Due Process and Equal Protection: When selecting insurers for inclusion in the 
exchange, the federal government must act rationally when making legislative 
classifications and distinctions. This analysis will also apply to state exchanges. 
 Takings Clause: Severe regulation of insurance has in a few instances been found by the 
courts to constitute a taking.  This must be considered when determining the limitations 
that will be placed on insurance providers to encourage participation in the HIE. This 
analysis will also apply to state exchanges. 
 Administrative Procedures Act: A federal HIE must comply with the standards and 
procedures relating to the freedom of information, records privacy, and adjudication 
applicable to all federal agencies. 
 Other Considerations: A comprehensive review of the tax code, as well as employee 
benefit and public health laws should be conducted once the federal HIE has been 
designed.  
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STATE EXCHANGES: There are no insurmountable legal barriers to implementation of HIEs 
at the state level. Certain Constitutional issues that apply equally to state exchanges have been 
analyzed under the federal exchange framework and stated above. 
 
 State Administrative Procedures Acts: Most, if not all, states have adopted legislation 
that outlines procedures for rulemaking, records privacy, adjudication, tort claims and 
government contracting. A state HIE must comply with existing state law, but these laws 
must be analyzed on a state by state basis. 
 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA): Federal law preempts any state 
law that relates to an employee benefit health plan. A state HIE would only be preempted 
if participation by employers is mandatory or if the state requires action on the part of an 
employer.  
 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA): Existing federal 
legislation contains non-discrimination, guaranteed access and pre-existing condition 
requirements that may need to be met by a state exchange if it offers insurance to 
employment-related groups.  
 
PRIVATE EXCHANGES: Implementation of a private HIE is not prevented by existing state 
or federal law.  
 
 Private Health Care Voluntary Purchasing Alliance Model Act: A number of states 
have adopted laws or regulations authorizing the creation of private exchanges.  Review 
of existing laws would be required to ensure they adequately support a multi-insurer 
framework. 
 Antitrust Laws: Current federal antitrust laws prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade. 
States, however, are exempt from antitrust law and could extend this exemption to private 
exchanges.  Private exchanges can also be structured to avoid antitrust violations. 
 Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangement Regulation (MEWAs): Membership and 
organizational rules will determine whether the state or federal government, or both, 
regulates private HIEs.   
 HIPAA: The consumer safeguards provided by existing federal legislation likely would 
not apply to HIEs unless a contractual relationship was established that identified the 
exchange as a business associate of insurers.  Under this agreement, HIEs would be 
limited in their ability to disclose personal health data to employers. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
Health insurance purchasing exchanges have been proposed as a possible means of making 
insurance more accessible, increasing competition among health plans, and promoting choice of 
insurer.  President Obama’s campaign proposal and various congressional leaders have proposed 
establishing insurance exchanges through federal legislation.  Although exchanges implicate 
many design and policy issues regardless of whether they are implemented at a federal, state, or 
private entity level, there are no absolute legal bars to the establishment of health insurance 
exchanges. 
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform: 
 Health Insurance Exchanges: Legal Issues 
 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost1 
 
Introduction 
 
This Legal Solutions in Health Reform paper identifies and analyzes the legal issues raised by 
health insurance exchanges.  Like all Legal Solutions papers, it does not purport to provide a 
concrete proposal as to how health insurance exchanges should be organized or even whether 
they should play a role in health care reform.  Rather, it attempts simply to describe the legal 
issues that health insurance exchanges raise, and to propose alternative solutions to legal 
problems where useful.  More specifically, it analyzes and offers alternative solutions to the legal 
problems raised by proposals to establish insurance exchanges by the federal government, by 
state governments, and by private entities or associations.  Because the focus of this project and 
paper is on legal issues, discussion of policy and design issues is attenuated.  Nevertheless, some 
attention to policy issues is unavoidable, because law is the realization of policy. 
 
Health insurance exchanges are entities that organize the market for health insurance, much like 
stock exchanges do for securities or farmers’ markets for produce.  They are intended to facilitate 
the availability, choice, and purchase of private health insurance plans for individuals and the 
employees of small groups.  They are usually government or non-profit institutions, but can be 
operated by the state or federal government or by private business associations or even by 
businesses.2   
 
Health insurance exchanges have been widely discussed as a solution to problems in the market 
for private health insurance.  They figure prominently in the reform campaign plan proposed by 
President Obama, while a health insurance exchange, the “Connector,” is at the heart of the 
much-discussed Massachusetts health reform program.3  The bipartisan Wyden-Bennett health 
insurance plan also relies on health insurance exchanges to organize the health insurance market.   
Another bipartisan bill, the Small Business Health Options Program Act of 2008 (S. 2795), has 
been introduced specifically to “establish a nationwide health insurance purchasing pool.”4 
 
At a minimum, exchanges centralize individual health plan enrollment and premium payments.  
They also provide information about insurance plans to those who purchase insurance through 
them, thus permitting individuals to compare the products of a number of insurers and to choose 
the best product for their needs. Exchanges can be used to facilitate employer payment for 
insurance premiums, including direct payments by individuals and payments collected by 
employers from employees through tax-advantaged Section 125 cafeteria arrangements or non- 
tax-advantaged payroll deductions.5  They could also be used to facilitate the use of tax credits to 
purchase insurance.  Some authors would limit exchanges to these functions, and indeed define 
exchanges in these terms.6 
 
Other advocates would, however, give exchanges additional, more regulatory, responsibilities.  
Exchanges can, for example, define the benefits that participating plans must cover or specify the 
rating practices that they must follow with respect to exchange purchasers.  The Obama 
campaign health plan would, for example, establish a national exchange to, “act as a watchdog 
group and help reform the private insurance market by creating rules and standards for 
participating insurance plans to ensure fairness and to make individual coverage more affordable 
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en the ages of 18 and 26.  
and accessible.”7  The Obama exchange proposal would “require that all the plans offered are at 
least as generous as the new public plan and have the same standards for quality and 
efficiency.”8  It would also “evaluate plans and make the differences among the plans, including 
cost of services, transparent.”9  The State Health Help Agencies included in the proposed 
Wyden-Bennett Healthy Americans Act would be required to “develop standardized language 
for HAPI [Healthy American Private Insurance] plan terms and conditions and require 
participating health insurance issuers to use such language in plan information documents,” as 
well as to ensure that plans follow the rating rules provided by the Act.10 The Massachusetts 
Connector, the most prominent currently existing example of an insurance exchange, also has 
extensive regulatory responsibilities, as described below.  An exchange with regulatory 
responsibilities would look very much like the health alliances proposed by the Clinton Health 
Security Act or like various proposed purchasing cooperatives or like those created by the states 
during the 1990s.   
 
In this paper, I will use the term “exchange” broadly to cover a range of entities, public and 
private, that 1) facilitate the purchase of private insurance plans by individuals and employees, 
and 2) make available to these individuals and employees a choice of a range of insurance plans.  
I include exchanges that perform additional regulatory functions.11 
 
The best known contemporary model of a health insurance exchange is the Massachusetts 
Connector, a model that is being considered by a number of other states.12  The Massachusetts 
Connector is a quasi-public authority governed by a ten member board, with three members 
appointed by the governor, three members appointed by the attorney general, and four members 
who serve by virtue of their government positions.13  The Connector’s responsibilities include: 
1) facilitating the purchase of insurance by individuals and small groups (of 50 or fewer 
members) by providing a centralized exchange for the purchase of approved health insurance 
products and by collecting premium payments from individuals and employers and remitting 
these to insurers; 2) defining the criteria that insurance products must meet to offer minimum 
creditable coverage for purposes of the state’s legal mandate that individuals purchase such 
coverage; 3) administering the new Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program for lower-
income Massachusetts residents; 4) certifying if uninsured residents are unable to find insurance 
they can afford for purposes of being excused from the individual mandate; 5) establishing 
regulations for the § 125 cafeteria arrangements that employers must establish under the 
Massachusetts reform; and 6) offering insurance at reduced rates for uninsured young adults 
betwe 14
 
Although some market advocates have hailed insurance exchanges (including the Connector) as 
a private market solution to the problems of health care cost, access, and quality, the Connector 
is in fact a quasi-government agency and many of its functions are regulatory.  Moreover, the 
Connector has fewer regulatory responsibilities than might have been necessary to ensure a 
functioning insurance exchange in other states because the health insurance market in 
Massachusetts was already heavily regulated before the Connector was established.  Even before 
the recent reforms, the insurance market in Massachusetts was subject to guaranteed issue 
requirements, modified community rating with no medical underwriting, a lengthy list of 
mandates, and a history of regulators refusing to approve high cost-sharing, low-benefit products 
(for which, in any event, there seemed to be little consumer demand).15   
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The Massachusetts Division of Insurance, rather than the Connector, continues to enforce these 
requirements.  The Massachusetts reform also instituted an individual mandate, which plays a 
key role in controlling adverse selection against the Connector.   
 
The extent to which exchanges act as regulators is only one of the ways in which exchanges can 
vary.  Another very important variable is whether they are established at the federal, state, or 
local level.  The Obama campaign proposal contemplates a national exchange as does the Small 
Business Health Options Program Act of 2008 (S. 2795), while the Wyden-Bennett proposal and 
state initiatives like the Massachusetts Connector locate exchanges at the state level.  
Additionally, private exchanges have been established by employers or by business coalitions.16  
Although private exchanges lack regulatory authority, they have their own purported advantages 
- more flexibility in hiring and firing and the capacity to react more rapidly to changing 
conditions, for example.   
 
With the election of President Obama, who campaigned on a platform of health reform, and 
strong Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate with leaders committed to health care 
financing reform - there is the real possibility of health reform legislation at the federal level.  If 
we were assured that Congress would adopt legislation creating a national insurance exchange, 
this paper could be very short.  The only legal limit on the ability of Congress to adopt 
legislation is the Constitution, and as will be discussed shortly, the Constitution imposes minimal 
constraints on the ability of Congress to act in this area.  Congress would face serious policy and 
design problems in creating a national insurance exchange program, but those issues are not the 
focus of this paper. 
 
It is important to remember, however, that we have been to the precipice of health insurance 
reform before, and Congress has not jumped.17  It is possible that the current economic crisis or 
other pressing policy priorities will delay or even derail health care financing reform.  Were that 
to happen, the states would have to take the initiative, as some of them are doing now.  Congress 
could remove some of the legal impediments that now limit state reforms.  Steps it could take to 
facilitate the creation of insurance exchanges by the states are described below.  But Congress 
might not even do that, leaving the states to navigate around existing law.  The states, moreover, 
are facing their own fiscal crises, and many may take no action on their own if Congress fails to 
act.  This could leave the private sector to take the initiative, and to find its way through the 
constraints of both federal and state law. 
 
This paper will proceed to explore the legal issues presented by the range of possible futures of 
health care financing reform.  It will first explore the limits that the law (primarily the 
Constitution) imposes on federal attempts to establish purchasing exchanges.  Second, it will 
examine the constraints that federal law imposes on states that choose to establish insurance 
exchanges, considering both what Congress could do to remove these impediments and how the 
states can deal with them if Congress fails to act.  Third, it discusses the legal constraints that the 
law imposes on private insurance exchanges.  Although these constraints are imposed both by 
federal and state law, this paper will focus on the issues raised by federal law, noting that state 
law is varied and any concrete proposal for a private exchange would need to be analyzed in 
detail under the laws of the particular state in which it was to be operated.  Finally, the paper will 
summarize the solutions it has suggested to the legal problems that it has identified. 
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I.  Federal Insurance Exchanges 
 
One possible approach, found in the Obama campaign plan, would be to establish a purchasing 
exchange at the federal level.  Ensuring that health insurance is uniformly available across the 
country would be valuable in itself, and a national exchange could effectively address the 
problems of adverse and favorable selection issues that are the central conundrums of health 
insurance reform by creating massive risk pools.  But a single national exchange could also pose 
serious administrative problems, particularly since there is little expertise in regulating insurance 
at the national level.  It is quite possible, therefore, there would not be one central exchange 
under a national reform program, but rather exchanges established at the state or regional level.  
This is the solution that has been reached in regionalizing other federal programs.  Examples of 
regional entities that have administered federal programs include Medicare contractors, Medicare 
Peer Review Organizations, and the Health Systems Agencies that were established under the 
National Health Resources and Development Act in the 1970s.  Congress might even attempt to 
require the states themselves to establish purchasing exchanges.  Of course, a single national 
exchange is not an impossibility.  The Federal Employees Health Benefits program and the 
Medicare Advantage program are both administered at the national level. 
 
Were a national plan to be established, it would face difficult design issues.  Such issues would 
include: 1) determining the regions exchanges would cover, specifically whether  they would be 
restricted by state lines or cover regions or multi-state metropolitan areas functioning like a 
single market; 2) the administrative relationship between exchanges and the central government, 
and whether  the exchanges would be administered by private contractors (as in Medicare) or 
federal/state entities; and 3) the level of uniformity that would be required in the system, 
specifically whether premiums, coverage, and eligibility requirements would be the same across 
the country.18  I focus here, however, on legal rather than design problems. 
 
A.  Federalism Issues 
 
First, implementation of a federal insurance exchange would require resolution of federalism 
issues.  The first of these is the question of whether the federal government has the constitutional 
authority to regulate health insurance contracts, i.e. whether the sale of insurance contracts 
constitutes interstate commerce.  The Supreme Court decided in 1944 that the federal 
government may constitutionally regulate insurance,19 and although there have been intervening 
decisions indicating that the federal government’s interstate commerce authority is not 
unbounded, that power certainly extends to insurance regulation. 
 
Congress would also need to consider the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  In response to the Court’s 
recognition in the 1940s that Congress had the power to regulate insurance contracts, Congress 
adopted a statute providing that “regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of 
insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be 
construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several 
States.”20  This means that Congress should not be considered to have preempted or superseded 
state law in the area of health insurance unless it does so expressly.  This does not limit the 
power of Congress to create federal insurance exchanges; it merely means that Congress would 
have to do so explicitly.  
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Congress might attempt to implement a federal exchange program through the states, thus taking 
advantage of the insurance regulation institutions and experience of the states.  In doing so, it 
would need to be mindful of the limitations the Constitution places on the power of the federal 
government to control the states.  The Constitution has been interpreted to preclude Congress 
from passing laws that “commandeer” the authority of the states for federal regulatory 
purposes.21  That is, Congress cannot require the states to participate in a federal insurance 
exchange program by simple fiat.  This limitation, however, would not necessarily block 
Congress from establishing insurance exchanges.  Congress could invite state participation in a 
federal program, and provide a federal fallback program to administer exchanges in states that 
refused to establish complying exchanges.22  Alternatively it could exercise its Constitutional 
authority to spend money for the public welfare (the “spending power”), either by offering tax 
subsidies for insurance only in states that complied with federal requirements (as it has done with 
respect to tax subsidies for health savings accounts) or by offering explicit payments to states 
that establish exchanges conforming to federal requirements.23 
 
B.  General Constitutional Constraints (Which Apply Also to State Insurance Exchanges) 
 
In addition to federalism issues, there are a variety of general constitutional issues that would 
affect government exchanges.  These issues would also apply to state and federally-established 
exchanges, but are discussed only in this section to avoid duplication.  One of the functions that 
an insurance exchange must fulfill is deciding which insurers can sell their products through the 
exchange.  Five possibilities here are readily apparent.  First, an exchange could allow any 
insurer to sell its products through the exchange that wanted to do so.  Second, the exchange 
could permit all insurers to participate that agreed to comply with certain standards to sell their 
products, effectively an “any willing provider” approach.  Third, the exchange could negotiate 
with insurers and only allow those to participate that concluded satisfactory negotiations to offer 
their products through the exchange.  Fourth, the exchange could decide to limit the number of 
insurers allowed to offer their products through the exchange, and then devise a process for 
deciding which insurers would make the cut-off, and which would not.  Finally, the state could 
not only bar some insurers from the exchange, but limit all insurance purchases (perhaps in the 
individual and small group market) to insurers participating in the exchange, effectively 
prohibiting any residents of the state from purchasing insurance from non-participating insurers. 
 
One of the primary advantages of an exchange is that it permits choice of insurers, particularly 
for employees of small businesses.  Allowing broad participation of insurers, therefore, would 
seem desirable.  On the other hand, another ideal that grounds health insurance exchanges is that 
of organizing or structuring competition among insurers.  Indeed, there is some evidence that too 
many choices can be confusing to consumers.24  Thus it might make sense for exchanges to limit 
the number of insurers and participating plans and to structure competition among those insurers.  
Indeed, insurers might be prohibited from selling policies to individuals or small groups except 
through the exchange.  Insurance exchanges might also be required to regulate the rating 
practices or benefit packages of insurers who sell policies through them, thus limiting 
participating insurers to those that accept limitations on these practices.   
 
If insurance exchanges are government-run or sponsored, their exclusionary or regulatory 
interventions may raise constitutional issues.25  The Due Process Clause of the Constitution 
requires the government to act rationally when it engages in social and economic regulation, 
while the Equal Protection Clause requires the government to make rational legislative 
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classifications and distinctions. The U.S. Constitution and most states’ constitutions prohibit the 
taking of private property for public use without just compensation.  Finally, state governments 
are under an additional constraint of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibiting 
states from adopting laws that impair “the obligation of contracts.”26 
 
Government regulation of economic conduct is acceptable under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses as long as it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.27  
Similarly, Contracts Clause challenges will not succeed unless a challenged regulation 
“substantially impairs a contractual relationship,” does not promote a significant and legitimate 
public interest, and is based on unreasonable conditions unrelated to the public purpose.28  
Finally, a regulatory law can be challenged under the takings clause, which bars the government 
from taking private property for public use without just compensation, if the law goes “too far” 
in the severity of its impact and in frustrating distinct “investment-backed expectations.”29 
 
Insurance has long been a heavily regulated industry, and constitutional challenges to 
requirements imposed by an exchange through regulation or negotiation are unlikely to succeed 
unless the requirements are wholly irrational.30  Courts have repeatedly rejected constitutional 
challenges to state insurance mandates, including statutes requiring insurers to provide maternity 
coverage31 and coverage for mental disorders.32  In the one reported constitutional case actually 
involving an insurance purchasing exchange, a federal court in Kentucky rejected Due Process 
and Commerce Clause challenges brought by an insurer against a statutory requirement that 
insurers offer only standard plans approved by a health policy board.33  State statutes that 
specifically restrict participation in markets by insurers have also been upheld.34  In analogous 
areas, courts have upheld the constitutionality of certificate of need programs, which prohibit 
private health care providers from entering markets or expanding their market participation 
without permission from the state,35 as well as federal Medicare amendments that prohibit 
physicians from selling their services to Medicare beneficiaries outside of the Medicare program 
unless the physician left the Medicare program for two years.36 
 
Probably the category of constitutional challenges most likely to succeed against reform laws 
establishing exchanges are those brought under the Takings Clause.  To this point, all such 
challenges have been brought against state rather than federal insurance regulation, although the 
Takings Clause applies equally to both federal and state governments.  In a number of cases in 
recent years particularly severe state laws regulating insurance have been successfully 
challenged under the Takings Clauses of the U.S. or of state constitutions, prominently among 
them laws rolling back or freezing rates, requiring insurers to fund residual markets using profits 
from other states or lines of business, or restricting insurers from exiting markets.37   
 
The success of these challenges, however, seems to be specific to particular jurisdictions.  For 
each instance in which a challenge has succeeded against a particular kind of law, similar laws in 
other jurisdictions have survived similar constitutional challenges.  For example, in a case 
involving New York’s attempt to create a risk pooling mechanism, a court observed that an 
insurer has no “constitutionally protected interest in maintaining a healthier than average risk 
pool.”38  As insurers face increasingly comprehensive regulation analogous to that traditionally 
faced by public utilities, a body of federal or state constitutional law may evolve providing 
insurers the right to make a just and reasonable return on their investment like that currently 
claimed by public utilities.39  It remains true; however, that government retains considerable 
discretion in regulating a wide range of insurer behavior.  
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Congress must take care that any insurance exchange program it initiates and operates is non-
discriminatory and does not engage in confiscatory regulation.  It is unlikely that the Constitution 
will, however, prove a significant barrier to the development of reasonable insurance exchanges.  
 
C.  Other Legal Issues Raised by Federal Insurance Exchanges 
 
An insurance exchange established by federal law will presumably be an agency subject to the 
Administrative Procedures Act, including provisions relating to the freedom of information, 
records privacy, open meetings, rulemaking, adjudication, and judicial review.40  Certain aspects 
of the program might also be subject to the Federal Acquisitions Regulations promulgated 
pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 405, which govern federal purchases of products and services.  These 
provisions would need to be considered in designing the exchange. 
 
If Congress were to create federal purchasing exchanges it would also need to amend a number 
of federal laws to clarify the relationship between federal and state regulatory power.  The most 
obvious of these would be the Employee Income Retirement Security Act of 1974, which is 
discussed below.  Once the design of a federal insurance exchange became clear, a 
comprehensive review of the federal tax, employee benefit, and public health laws would be 
necessary to make sure that they properly reflected the balance of federal and state regulatory 
power contemplated by the purchasing exchange program. 
 
II. State Insurance Exchanges 
 
A.  Constitutional Law 
 
The constitutional law issues that affect state insurance exchanges were discussed in the previous 
section and will not be repeated here.   
 
B.  Governance Issues 
 
If an exchange is established as a state agency, it will be subject to state administrative law.  
About two thirds of the states have adopted some version of the Model State Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA).  The Model State APA prescribes procedures for rule making, 
adjudication, and judicial review.  Each state also has an open meetings and freedom of 
information statute.41  State-run insurance exchanges will presumably be subject to these laws 
unless they are specifically exempted by statute.42  They will also presumably be subject, like 
other state agencies, to state laws addressing civil service, government contracting, and 
government tort claims. These laws vary from state to state, and cannot be discussed in detail 
here. 
 
Another issue that will have to be addressed is how a state insurance exchange interfaces with 
other state agencies.  This is primarily a design issue, but will require the drafting of new laws or 
the amendment of existing laws for implementation.  The Massachusetts Connector was 
established as an independent authority, but the Massachusetts Division of Insurance continues 
to regulate health insurance plans generally, while the Department of Finance is responsible for 
enforcement of the individual mandate.  The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) has adopted both a “Single Health Care Voluntary Purchasing Alliance Model Act” (78-
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1) and a “Regional Health Care Voluntary Purchasing Alliance Model Act” (80-1) which 
presents the states with different options for creating exchanges at the state or regional level.  
These statutes would place regional alliances under the state commissioner of insurance, but 
establish a separate state agency for the single state exchange authority.  The Single State 
Exchange Model Act states in a drafting note,  
 
This Act establishes the purchasing alliance as a state agency.  However, 
states may wish to establish the purchasing alliance as a state-chartered 
nonprofit organization.  States may also consider establishment under an 
existing state agency such as the office of commissioner.”43   
 
States will also have to coordinate between the purchasing alliance and other state agencies, 
including: 1) the agency responsible for the Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, if Medicaid or SCHIP recipients are covered through the purchasing pool; 2) the entity 
that purchases care for state employees or retirees, if state employees or retirees are covered 
through the purchasing pool; 3) the state health insurance assistance program; and 4) any 
separate agency that regulates managed care, if applicable.   
 
C.  Issues Raised by Federal Law 
 
If health insurance reform proceeds primarily at the state rather than the federal level, the states 
will need to come to terms with federal laws that limit their options.  To date, as noted above, 
insurance regulation has primarily been the responsibility of the states.  Congress has, however, 
adopted a number of laws partially preempting state authority over health insurance, particularly 
in the area of employee benefits.  If the federal government assumes responsibility for health 
care financing or its regulation, these laws will presumably be repealed or comprehensively 
amended to transfer the responsibility of insurance regulation from the states to the federal 
government.  If Congress decides rather to leave health reform to the states, Congress could 
repeal or amend these laws to afford the states the freedom to enact their own reform programs.  
If Congress does nothing, the states will have to adapt to these laws as they exist.  This section 
explores the latter two possibilities. 
  
1.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 Preemption 
 
In general, preemption is a legal principle that bars state regulation of a subject if federal law 
expressly precludes state regulation, if the state regulation would conflict with federal law, or if 
the federal government comprehensively regulates an area of activity, thus excluding state 
regulation.  For example, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) regulates the 
administration of employer sponsored benefit plans including health benefits.  One of the issues 
that state established exchanges face is the possibility of ERISA preemption—that is that the 
federal ERISA statute will bar states from establishing and operating insurance exchanges in the 
manner they would prefer.  The general law of ERISA preemption is fully addressed in another 
Legal Solutions in Health Reform authored by Peter Jacobson.  The importance of ERISA, 
however, justifies some consideration here.  ERISA is also discussed further in the next section 
with respect to the question of whether its multiple employer welfare arrangements (MEWA) 
provisions affect private plans.   
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plans.     
Section 514 of ERISA explicitly preempts any state law that “relates to” an employee benefits 
plan.44  The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that any state law is 
preempted that has “a connection with or reference to” a benefits plan.45  Although ERISA also 
provides that state laws that regulate insurance are saved from preemption, it further stipulates 
that states may not regulate self-insured insurance plans.  Finally, section 502 of ERISA has been 
construed by the Supreme Court to preclude any state judicial remedies against ERISA 46
 
In the insurance exchange context, ERISA preemption is likely to be an issue only with respect 
to state laws that seek some way to compel an employer to establish an employee benefit plan or 
to compel an employee benefit plan to participate in an exchange.  It should not affect state 
insurance exchanges in which participation is strictly voluntary and which do not require action 
to be taken by either an employer or an employee benefits plan.  ERISA would also not affect 
private exchanges that do not have legal authority to require employers or benefit plans to 
participate.47  ERISA explicitly saves from preemption state laws regulating insurance,48 and 
thus ERISA would not limit a state’s ability to require insurers to sell their products through an 
insurance exchange or to regulate the products insurers sell through exchanges.  This is 
consistent with the long-standing policy of Congress, articulated in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
to leave the regulation of insurance to the states.  ERISA should also not preclude a state from 
requiring individuals to purchase insurance through an insurance exchange.49 
 
ERISA, however, does impose significant limitations on the states.  ERISA almost certainly 
prohibits states from requiring any employer offering health benefits to provide those benefits 
through an exchange.  Such a law would be seen as a law “relating to” an ERISA benefits plan, 
preempted by federal law.50  ERISA might also preclude states from imposing a requirement 
directly on employers who do not currently provide health insurance benefits to begin providing 
health insurance through an exchange or to pay an assessment to the state.  Federal courts are 
now split on the question of preemption of state “pay or play” laws and the enforceability of such 
laws may turn on their precise provisions.51  Finally, it would be unwise for a state insurance 
exchange statute to explicitly mention ERISA plans lest it fall afoul of the “reference to” 
prohibition.  In one case, for example, the Supreme Court held that a state law prohibiting 
garnishment of ERISA benefits to be preempted because of the explicit reference to ERISA plans 
in the law.52 
 
One unsettled issue is whether ERISA would prohibit states that establish insurance exchanges 
from requiring employers who do not otherwise offer health insurance to forward payments, 
taken out of their employees’ wages on a payroll deduction basis, to the exchanges, through a 
section 125 Cafeteria arrangement.53  A section 125 Cafeteria arrangement allows an employer 
to withhold a sum of money specified by the employee on a pre-tax basis from an employee’s 
wages, and allows the employee to use that money to purchase certain specific benefits.54  States 
considering health insurance reform in general and health insurance exchanges in particular have 
found the section 125 option of particular interest.  Specifically, the section 125 option allows 
employees to obtain federal tax subsidies for their own expenditures so that they can purchase 
insurance through an exchange, assuming that ERISA does not allow the states to require 
employers to offer their employees health insurance purchased through an exchange.  The 
Massachusetts law, as noted above, requires employers with more than 11 workers (under the 
threat of a penalty if other conditions are met) to establish section 125 arrangements for their 
employees, through which funds may be channeled to the Connector to purchase health 
insurance. 
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As discussed below, it is arguable that a section 125 arrangement is a “group health plan” under 
the Internal Revenue Code.  It could be argued by extension that it is also an ERISA plan, and 
thus that ERISA prohibits states from requiring employers to establish section 125 Cafeteria 
arrangements through which employee contributions can be channeled to insurance exchanges.  
There are, however, convincing arguments that section 125 arrangements are not ERISA plans.  
First, ERISA defines an employee benefits plan as a plan “established or maintained” by an 
employer.55  In several instances, courts have found that an ERISA plan did not exist when 
employers simply assisted employees in paying individual health or disability insurance 
premiums from the employee’s own funds without further involvement in the insurance 
relationship.56    
 
Second, the Labor Department regulations establish a safe harbor that excludes from the ERISA 
plan definition “group or group-type” insurance arrangements if five conditions are met: 1) the 
employer does not contribute its own funds; 2) employee participation is voluntary; 3) the 
employer does not “endorse” the arrangement; 4) the employer does nothing more than to allow 
an insurer to publicize the arrangement to employees and to collect premiums through payroll 
deductions; and 5) the employer receives no consideration beyond reasonable compensation for 
administrative services.57 
 
There are dozens of cases litigating the application of this safe harbor to particular arrangements, 
usually in the context of an insurer seeking the protection of ERISA preemption against a state 
law claim brought by an aggrieved member.  This litigation generally focuses on the third safe 
harbor criterion–the prohibition against endorsement by an employer.  The cases tend to hold 
that if an objectively reasonable employee would conclude that an employer has not simply made 
a plan available, but has also exercised control over the plan or made it appear to be part of the 
employer’s own benefit package, the arrangement will be considered an ERISA plan.  If an 
employer becomes actively involved in the promotion or administration of a plan funded through 
a section 125 arrangement, courts are likely to find the plan to be an ERISA plan on employer 
endorsement grounds.58 
   
If, on the other hand, an employer simply collects premiums from employees on a payroll 
deduction basis and forwards them to insurers, courts should find that no ERISA plan exists.59  If 
a section 125 Cafeteria arrangement exists solely by operation of a state law requirement, and the 
employer has taken no action to endorse the purchase of insurance through the arrangement other 
than to comply with state law, it is difficult to see why the arrangement would not fit within the 
ERISA safe harbor.60  The argument that an employer has not endorsed a plan would be 
particularly strong if a state directed employee funds collected under a section 125 arrangement 
to a purchasing exchange rather than to a particular insurance plan, as the employee and not the 
employer would be choosing the employee’s insurance plan through the exchange.61 
 
Third and finally, the only Department of Labor advisory opinion examining the question of 
ERISA and section 125 arrangements concluded that a section 125 arrangement was not “the 
equivalent of the provision of a benefit enumerated under” the ERISA definition of an ERISA 
plan.62  Thus a state requirement that employers allow their employees to pay for health benefits 
through a state insurance purchasing exchange by way of a section 125 arrangement would not 
seem to be preempted by ERISA. 
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Congress could, of course, amend section 125 of the Tax Code and ERISA to clarify that the 
states can require employers to establish section 125 arrangements to allow employees to 
purchase individual health insurance policies, including policies purchased through a state-
sponsored health insurance exchange.  The Department of Labor could probably accomplish the 
same end through an administrative regulation or ruling, given the uncertainty in this area. 
Alternatively, Congress could simply extend the tax subsidies currently offered in employment-
related health insurance to individual insurance, which would obviate the need for section 125 
arrangements.  In the absence of any amendments in the federal law, however, it appears that the 
states are permitted to require employers to establish section 125 plans for the purchase of 
insurance through health insurance exchanges, as Massachusetts has done. 
 
2.  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act  
 
The application of another federal law, the insurance portability provisions of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), raises other legal issues that would affect 
the implementation of an insurance exchange at the state level.  The specific issue is whether an 
arrangement where an employer pays insurance premiums for its employees through an 
insurance exchange creates a group health plan under HIPAA.  
 
HIPAA prohibits group health plans and health insurance issuers from discriminating on the 
basis of health status in determining eligibility or premiums for members of group health plans.  
HIPAA imposed these requirements through amendments to ERISA, the Public Health Service 
Act, and the Internal Revenue Code (the “Tax Code”), all of which are quite similar.63  These 
provisions effectively require guaranteed issue and community rating to individuals within group 
health plans without regard to health status.  If HIPAA applies to purchases of insurance for 
employees through an insurance exchange, insurers would not be able to underwrite individual 
employees who purchase insurance through the exchange separately, but would need to offer 
insurance to all otherwise eligible employees of any single employer and offer them the same 
rate.  Other provisions of HIPAA require guaranteed issue and renewal for group plans and limit 
the use of preexisting conditions clauses within group plans.64  These provisions would also 
apply if employees of a single employer who purchase insurance through an exchange were 
treated as a single group.  The application of HIPAA to state health insurance exchanges would 
not preclude the creation of exchanges, but it would have clear implications for their design.  
Instead of simply facilitating the purchase of individual insurance policies through a coordinated 
market, exchanges would rather be coordinating the sale of policies to employment-related 
groups (in addition to individuals who were not employed). 
 
The ERISA provision of HIPAA, 29 USC § 1182, adopts the ERISA definition of “group health 
plan” discussed above, under which the key question is whether the plan is “established or 
maintained” by the employer.65  If an employer pays part of the cost of the premium or in some 
other way endorses a plan purchased through an exchange, HIPAA would apply and the above 
requirements would apply to the plan purchased through the exchange.  This is true even though 
the employer pays for separate individual policies for each employee, a so called “list billing” 
arrangement.66  If an employer, however, neither contributes to the cost of insurance for 
employees nor “endorses” a plan, it would seem that policies purchased on a payroll deduction 
basis (for example, through a section 125 arrangement) would not be subject to the HIPAA non-
discrimination, small group coverage, or pre-existing conditions rules under the ERISA statute, 
but would simply be individual insurance policies.67   
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The HIPAA requirements, however, are also found in the Tax Code, which incorporates the Tax 
Code definition of “group health plan.”  The Tax Code defines the term “group health plan” 
somewhat differently than does ERISA.  It defines a group health plan as a “plan (including a 
self-insured plan) of, or contributed to by, an employer (including a self-employed person) or 
employee organization to provide health care (directly or otherwise) to the employees” 
(emphasis added).68  This definition raises issues if a state attempts to require employers to fund 
health insurance purchases by requiring employers to establish section 125 arrangements. 
 
Section 125 regulations recently proposed by the Department of the Treasury explicitly permit 
payment of individual health insurance premiums from a section 125 arrangement, either directly 
to the insurer or on an indemnity basis to the employee, suggesting that the individual policies do 
not become group policies simply because the employer collects and remits premium 
payments.69  Section 125, however, only exempts from taxation expenditures for “qualified 
benefits,” i.e. benefits otherwise exempt from taxation under other sections of the Tax Code.70  
The relevant provision of the Tax Code exempting health benefits is section 106, which excludes 
“employer-provided coverage.”   
 
Arguably, therefore, insurance provided through a section 125 arrangement is a group health 
plan under HIPAA because it is “employer-provided.”  It can also be argued that a section 125 
arrangement is a group health plan because it is funded by an employer contribution, because the 
statute provides that funds in a section 125 arrangement are not part of an employee’s gross 
income, and thus might be considered funds contributed by an employer.  The IRS has 
informally taken the position that the use of section 125 arrangements to purchase individual 
policies makes them group policies for purposes of the Tax Code, and thus for the HIPAA 
provisions of the Tax Code.71  In this view, insurance policies purchased by employees of a 
single employer through an insurance exchange with the funds provided under a section 125 
arrangement would have to comply with the HIPAA non-discrimination, guaranteed access and 
renewability, and pre-existing conditions requirements of HIPAA. 
 
The entire issue of the application of HIPAA is avoided, of course, if a state itself requires 
community rating, guaranteed issue and renewal, and limits pre-existing conditions clauses from 
insurers offering insurance through an insurance exchange.  Federal requirements under HIPAA 
would, in that case, be superfluous.  Congress could also amend HIPAA to clarify either that 
HIPAA does or does not apply to insurance policies purchased through exchanges with section 
125 funds. The Internal Revenue Service could also possibly clarify this issue through a 
regulation or some other form of guidance.  Alternatively, Congress could simply extend the 
requirements of HIPAA to all health insurance policies.  If Congress does not change the law, 
however, and a state allows insurers to underwrite and rate individuals covered through the 
exchange individually, it would seem that the insurers would not be able to do so within ERISA 
group health plans and within groups of individuals whose premiums are paid by a single 
employer through a section 125 arrangement. 
 
D.  State Regulation of Underwriting, Premiums, and Benefits 
 
States that regulate non-group insurance or insured ERISA plans are permitted to regulate 
insurance underwriting, premium rates, and benefits.  Most states do so to a greater or lesser 
extent.72  States, for example, require insurers to guarantee coverage and renewal to small groups 
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(implementing HIPAA), while some states go further, requiring insurers to offer community 
rates to small groups or individuals or limit the dispersion of rates through rating bands.  States 
also require insurance plans to cover specific benefits, providers, and eligible individuals.  The 
extent to which states regulate underwriting, premium rates, and benefit coverage is a matter of 
public policy rather than law.  The policy arguments for and against underwriting, rating, and 
benefit coverage mandates are well known (and passionately asserted), and will not be repeated 
here.73  Since these forms of regulation must be implemented by state law, however, they will be 
addressed briefly here. 
 
States that create public or authorize quasi-public purchasing exchanges can apply underwriting, 
rating regulation, and coverage mandates either generally to the entire insurance market or only 
within the purchasing exchange.  A state is free to make its own policy choices in determining 
which approach to take ,as long as it does not attempt to apply such laws to self-insured ERISA 
plans or permit the violation of HIPAA requirements with respect to group plans. 
 
If a state attempts to apply underwriting and rating requirements within an insurance exchange 
that are not applied generally in the relevant market, or attempts to impose benefit mandates 
within an exchange that are not imposed generally, it exposes the exchange to adverse selection, 
which might make the arrangement untenable.74  If insurers are allowed to underwrite in the 
market generally, but not within the insurance exchange, the exchange may in effect become a 
high-risk pool.  If insurers are required to community rate within the insurance exchange but not 
otherwise, they may not participate in the exchange.  If states require insurers to offer more 
generous benefits within the exchange than they can outside of it, the rates for exchange products 
may become comparatively unattractive. 
 
 
Community rating is not the only available strategy to make insurance purchased through an 
insurance exchange affordable to persons with poor risk profiles.  An insurance exchange could 
also, for example, collect premiums (and tax credits or other forms of public insurance vouchers) 
and then pay out premiums on a risk-adjusted basis, as Medicare does with Medicare Advantage 
and the Part D drug benefit plan premiums.  Alternatively, insurers selling their products through 
the risk pool could be required to participate in a risk reinsurance pool, so that plans would not 
be disadvantaged by taking higher risk insureds.  Third, a public reinsurance program could be 
provided to backstop insurers who cover the highest risks.75  Fourth, the simple imposition of an 
individual mandate could create a large enough risk pool that insurers would be comfortable 
taking on greater risk exposure.  Finally, simply providing substantial state subsidies for 
individuals who purchase insurance through an exchange (but not otherwise) would go far 
toward reducing adverse selection against exchange insurers.  Each of these solutions, however, 
may create additional responsibilities for exchanges. 
 
III. Private Exchanges 
 
If exchanges are created neither by the federal nor state government, but rather privately by 
business coalitions or groups of employers, they face a different set of legal issues.76  These 
entities must comply with state laws regulating insurance.  The NAIC has a “Private Health Care 
Voluntary Purchasing Alliance Model Act,”77  and a number of states have adopted laws or 
regulations authorizing the creation of insurance exchanges.78  State insurance laws regulating 
association health plans should also be reviewed to determine if they affect particular 
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arrangements, although exchanges should be distinguishable from Association Health Plans 
(AHPs) because exchanges offer a choice of a number of insurers while AHPs usually provide 
insurance themselves either through self-insurance or by contract.79  Some states prohibit list 
billing, which could close off one approach to funding employee health care through purchasing 
exchanges.80    
 
Exchanges would, moreover, have to comply with their contractual obligations and could face 
claims under business torts.  Both regulatory and common law vary from state to state, and a 
fifty state survey of all state insurance regulations that might affect an insurance exchange would 
be less productive than focused analysis of an actual proposal in its own state environment.  
There are three federal laws that would affect privately operated purchasing exchanges, however: 
the antitrust laws, ERISA provisions regulating multiple employer welfare associations 
(MEWAs), and the HIPAA privacy regulations.  These will be briefly considered here.   
 
A.  Antitrust Law 
 
Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits “every contract, combination . . . or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade,” while section two prohibits monopolization.81  Although the 
federal antitrust laws are most commonly enforced against sellers of products and services, they 
also prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade imposed by buyers.  Monopsony, or the domination 
of a market by a buyer, just like monopoly can distort markets, and can potentially reduce the 
quantity and quality of available products. 
 
The explicit purpose of an insurance exchange is to restrain trade since it organizes the purchase 
of insurance by individuals and groups.  Insurance exchanges can potentially achieve near 
monopsonistic market power in the private insurance market.   
 
 
At the same time, antitrust law has long permitted purchasers to engage in joint ventures, 
including purchasing cooperatives that enhance efficiency and do not create undue purchaser 
market power.  It is a fair question, therefore, whether the federal antitrust laws would limit 
insurance exchanges. 
 
To begin, federal antitrust laws do not restrict the authority of the states to establish government-
run insurance exchanges.  The Massachusetts Connector, for example, is not subject to an 
antitrust challenge.  Antitrust law has developed the State Action Doctrine to accommodate the 
interests of federalism and also permit states to engage in regulatory supervision of commerce in 
their states.  The State Action Doctrine exempts state entities from federal antitrust law if their 
conduct is compelled or clearly authorized by state law.  If the state law pertains to conduct by 
private actors, that conduct must be compelled or authorized and must be actively supervised by 
the state.82  Situations arise, however, in which the state explicitly or impliedly authorizes or 
encourages actors to engage in conduct that violates federal antitrust law, but the level of state 
supervision may fall short of that required under Supreme Court precedent.  Thus, the State 
Action Doctrine would not apply, leaving the conduct exposed to antitrust enforcement.    
 
If an insurance exchange is created solely by private action, for example, by a coalition of private 
employers, there is by definition a combination of actors, leaving only the question of whether 
this combination is a restraint of trade.  This is a complex question, the answer to which depends 
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heavily on the factual situation of a particular exchange.  The issues raised by antitrust law for 
insurance exchanges were analyzed thoroughly by Clark Havighurst a decade ago,83 and a 
decade earlier by H. Robert Harper and John J. Miles,84  and their analysis will not be repeated in 
detail here.   
 
A few salient points can, however, be made.  First, as already noted, private purchasing 
coalitions are problematic under the federal antitrust laws.  Courts applying the antitrust laws 
may be somewhat less troubled by buyer than by seller cartels, but restraints of trade imposed by 
buyers can still be antitrust violations.  Second, naked price restraints imposed by a combination 
of buyers and lacking any efficiency justifications can be per se violations of the antitrust laws—
that is, illegal regardless of any other justification that may be offered.  In most instances, 
however, courts will evaluate purchasing coalitions  under the rule of reason—that is, review 
their legality in the context of their particular market and  consider their “pro” and “anti” 
competitive effects.  Applying the rule of reason, courts will be concerned with pro-competitive 
justifications for joint purchasing arrangements.  Given the market failures present in health care, 
it may be quite possible to justify joint purchasing as efficiency enhancing in many situations.85  
In particular, purchasing pools are pro-competitive insofar as they offer individuals and small 
employers the chance to achieve risk pooling and economies of scale not otherwise available.  
Third, if an exchange does nothing more than organize a market for insurance without 
negotiating prices, for example, by providing information, structuring choices, and discouraging 
adverse selection, it is unlikely to be found in violation of the antitrust laws.  Indeed, such 
activities may increase rather than suppress competition.86    
 
A coalition without excessive market power is probably safe in any event.  Defining the relevant 
product and geographic markets affected by insurance exchanges itself is a complicated 
endeavor.  Antitrust cases have in various contexts identified insurance markets on the “sell 
side,” the markets in which insurers sell their products, as including individual and small groups, 
and excluding larger employers and self-insured plans.  The ‘buy side’ market, in which insurers 
compete with other purchasers in purchasing services, such as physician services, may include 
other purchasers such as Medicare and Medicaid, and not be limited to private insurers only.  A 
market must be defined for the market share to be determined.  If the market is defined narrowly 
enough, insurance exchanges affecting private plans may be found to have large market shares, 
but  if the market is defined broadly, their share may not be troublesomely large. 
 
The Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission Statement on Antitrust Enforcement 
Policy in Health Care on Joint Purchasing Arrangements creates a safe harbor for health care 
providers whose “purchases account for less than 35 percent of the total sales of the purchased 
product or services in the relevant market,”87 a market-percentage that would probably apply to 
insurance purchasing as well.  However, a coalition that offers its members access to a wide 
variety of insurance plans and products is unlikely to be found to be in restraint of trade even if 
its share is larger.   
 
Currently existing private insurance exchanges have tended to control only a small share of the 
market, and thus not to pose antitrust problems.  If this were to change, Congress could amend 
the antitrust laws to exempt health insurance exchanges that allow the participation of multiple 
insurers from antitrust scrutiny.  
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Alternatively, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission could promulgate a new 
enforcement guideline delineating more clearly the circumstances under which they would 
consider a private health insurance exchange to be in compliance with the antitrust laws. 
 
B.  Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangement Regulation 
 
A private insurance exchange that offers health insurance to employees is a multiple employer 
welfare arrangement (MEWA) under ERISA, and thus subject to regulation under state and 
federal law.  The extent to which a private exchange is subject to state or federal regulation 
depends, however, on the type of MEWA it would regulate.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(40) defines a 
MEWA as: 
 
an employee welfare benefit plan, or any other arrangement (other than an 
employee welfare benefit plan), which is established or maintained for the 
purpose of offering or providing any benefit described earlier in the statute, 
including health insurance, to the employees of two or more employers (including 
one or more self-employed individuals), or to their beneficiaries.88  
 
An “employee welfare benefit plan,” as noted in the above discussion of ERISA , is “any plan, 
fund, or program which . . .is . . . established or maintained by an employer or by an employee 
organization, or by both, . . .for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, 
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, []medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits. . 
. .”89  Finally, an employer is “any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the 
interest of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan; and includes a group or 
association of employers acting for an employer in such capacity” (emphasis added). 90 
 
Under these definitions, if a group of employers gets together to form an insurance exchange, it 
would almost certainly be a MEWA, but could be either be 1) a MEWA which is also an 
employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA established or maintained by an “employer,”(which 
can be a group or association of employers) or 2) a MEWA which is “any other arrangement . . . 
established or maintained for the purpose of offering or providing” health insurance to 
employees of two or more employers or to self-employed individuals.”91  Under the Department 
of Labor’s interpretation of ERISA, a “group or association” of employers can only be an 
“employer” if it is determined to be a bona fide group of employers, taking into consideration a 
number of factors, including how members are solicited, who can participate and who in fact 
participates, the purpose of the organization, any pre-existing relationships among the members, 
and most importantly, whether the employee-members of the group exercise control over the 
program.92  An exchange formed by an association of employers who do not qualify as a bona 
fide group or by a private entity other than a bona fide employer group could be an “other 
arrangement” MEWA, but would not be an employee welfare benefit plan.93   
 
MEWAs that are also ERISA plans are fully regulated by ERISA, including its disclosure, 
fiduciary obligation, HIPAA, and benefit mandate provisions.  Thus an insurance exchange that 
was considered to be an ERISA plan-MEWA could be sued in federal court by its members for 
breach of fiduciary obligation or for a denial of claims and could not discriminate in premiums or 
eligibility based on health status.  A MEWA that is not an employee welfare benefit plan is not 
itself regulated by ERISA, but each participating employer is considered to each have 
independently established a single-employer plan subject to ERISA.94  The administrators of a 
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 ERISA.  
non-ERISA plan MEWA are nonetheless still likely to be held to be fiduciaries insofar as they 
have discretionary duties in administering the terms of the constituent employers’ ERISA 
plans.95  Federal law also requires MEWAs to file with the Department of Labor.96 
 
Under the 1983 Erlenborn Amendment, states are empowered to regulate ERISA plans that are 
also MEWAs.  This amendment to ERISA allows states to regulate both insured and self-insured 
MEWAs that are ERISA plans, effectively exempting them from the preemptive power of 
ERISA provisions that prohibit the states from regulating self-insured plans.97  By definition, 
insurance exchanges would be insured rather than self-insured MEWAs, since exchanges exist to 
organize a market in which several insurers offer plans to exchange participants rather than offer 
insurance themselves.  Under this section of ERISA states are limited in their authority to 
regulate insured MEWAs.98  States may only impose, “standards, requiring the maintenance of 
specified levels of reserves and specified levels of contributions, which any such plan, or any 
trust established under such a plan, must meet in order to be considered under such law able to 
pay benefits in full when due” on an insured MEWA.99  This would rarely be relevant to 
insurance exchanges, since they do not normally bear risk.  States may also presumably regulate 
any insurer that sells insurance through an exchange because regulation of insurers would be 
saved from preemption under the general ERISA savings clause, which saves state insurance 
regulation from preemption.100  But the state regulation would probably have to apply to all 
insurers in the market, which could be the small group or individual market, not just to insurers 
participating in a particular exchange.   
 
Finally, states may regulate private insurance exchanges that might be classified as MEWAs, but 
are not ERISA plans, under the states’ inherent police power, since state regulation of MEWAs 
that are not ERISA plans do not “relate to” ERISA plans.101  States may be limited in their 
ability to provide judicial remedies for beneficiaries against insurers who provide insurance 
through such MEWAs, however, because beneficiaries are members of their own employer’s 
single-employer ERISA plan, and only secondarily members of the MEWA.  Thus actions 
against the insurers may be considered to be actions against those plans and thus would be 
preempted by ERISA’s remedial provisions.102  State law claims brought by employers against a 
MEWA, on the other hand, are not preempted by 103
 
Private insurance exchanges are likely to be classified as MEWAs, and thus, in general be 
subject to state regulation.  The power of the states to regulate insurance exchanges operated by 
“bona fide” employer associations, and thus considered to be ERISA plans, is very limited and 
does not reach the most important issues that states may want to regulate.  Private insurance 
exchanges that are MEWAs, but not ERISA plans, are subject to state regulation, but are 
probably also subject to the ERISA requirements that bind plan administrators to the extent that 
the exchange managers act as administrators of the ERISA plans of the MEWA’s member 
employers.104  To date, many states have not yet exercised their authority to regulate MEWAs, 
and few states have regulated MEWAs effectively.105  
 
If Congress adopts comprehensive health insurance reform, but leaves a role for private health 
insurance exchanges, it could take over responsibility for regulating them or clarify the authority 
of the states to regulate.  If Congress takes no action, states would still be free to exercise their 
authority to regulate MEWAs that are not operated by “bona fide” employer associations.  They 
may also want to test carefully the status of MEWAs that claim to be ERISA plans since they are 
largely exempt from state regulation.   
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C.  HIPAA Data Privacy Requirements 
 
Private insurance exchanges would, finally, be subject to HIPAA regulations on privacy.106  The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule is discussed at length in another Legal Solutions in Health Reform 
authored by Deven McGraw so it will only be addressed briefly here.  The privacy rule applies to 
any individually identifiable health information in the hands of covered entities.  Covered entities 
include only health care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses.107  “Health 
plans” include most public and private insurers, including those that would participate in 
insurance exchanges, but would seem not to include an exchange itself.108  
 
Health plans may disclose information without consent for 1) treatment, 2) health care 
operations, which includes “underwriting, premium rating, and other activities relating to the 
operation, 3) renewal or replacement of a contract of health insurance or health benefits,” and 4) 
payment, which includes “activities undertaken by a health plan to obtain premiums.”109  Health 
plans may also disclose “de-identified data,”110 which is not covered by HIPAA, and may 
disclose personal health data, which is covered, to “business associates” with appropriate 
contractual assurances to safeguard data.111  It would seem that health plans could disclose health 
information regarding their members to health insurance exchanges under one or more of these 
provisions, subject however, to a further caveat.  Health plans, and therefore insurance 
exchanges as their agents, may only disclose to “plan sponsors” (i.e. employers) de-identified 
“summary health information” and information as to whether an individual is participating in the 
sponsor’s group health plan.112  This would limit information flow from exchanges to employers 
who purchase insurance through them. 
 
Although HIPAA constraints on the information that health plans can share with exchanges and 
exchanges with employers are important; data flow in the other direction from employers or 
employees to exchanges and then to health plans for underwriting or setting premiums is likely 
to be even more important.  Information acquired by a health insurance exchange in this way 
would in all likelihood only be protected by HIPAA if the exchange were a business associate of 
a health plan that “allow[ed] a business associate to create or receive protected health 
information on its behalf.”113  It would be important, therefore, for health insurance exchanges to 
enter into contracts with health plans that identify the exchange as a “business associate” of the 
health plans with assurances that the exchange would protect any personal health information it 
received to be sent on to covered plans.  If this is not done, individuals and employers may be 
reluctant to disclose information to exchanges. 
 
Congress should amend HIPAA to clarify that health insurance exchanges are bound by the 
HIPAA privacy rule, perhaps by including them within the definition of “health plan” found in 
HIPAA’s language.114  Even if Congress fails to amend HIPAA specifically for insurance 
exchange, private health insurance exchanges could enter into business associate contracts with 
health care plans whose products they sell and could comply with HIPAA requirements, 
including limitations on the sharing of identifiable health data with employers.  
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IV. Summary of Potential Solutions 
 
A.  Implementation of a Federal Purchasing Exchange 
 
Congress could constitutionally establish an exchange program operated solely by the federal 
government, which could be operated either at the national or the regional level.  Congress, 
however, cannot simply command the states to implement a federally established and defined 
health exchange program.  It could, however, use its power to spend money to offer the states 
financial incentives to encourage them to participate in an insurance exchange program.  
Alternatively, Congress could invite the states to establish exchanges, but also administer a 
federally-operated fall-back program for states that decline participation, as it does now with 
respect to HIPAA provisions.  Whatever approach it takes, Congress should make certain that 
any statute it adopts explicitly notes that the program is being established as one that regulates 
the business of insurance to forestall challenges under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  If Congress 
establishes a national purchasing exchange program, it must be aware of other applicable federal 
administrative law requirements, and either amend relevant laws accordingly or ensure that 
federal exchanges comply with them. 
 
The Due Process, Equal Protection, and Takings Clauses of the Constitution limit the power of 
Congress to regulate insurers, although the Constitution prohibits only extreme discriminatory or 
confiscatory actions, and would not preclude most forms of regulation.  Government exchanges 
that allow all insurers that accept exchange rules to participate in exchanges are unlikely to face 
successful constitutional litigation.  If government exchanges exclude insurers from 
participating, they should do so according to clearly established guidelines and for clearly 
articulated purposes. 
 
B.  State Exchanges 
 
If Congress fails to take action to establish a national health insurance exchange, the states could 
take the initiative to establish exchanges on their own.  States initiating purchasing exchanges 
would be bound by the same constitutional constraints facing the federal government, in addition 
to the peculiarities of state constitutions, which, in some instances, impose greater restraints on 
economic regulation.   
 
 State exchanges will also need to comply with state administrative law and other laws governing 
state agencies, such as state civil service or purchasing requirements.  States establishing 
insurance exchanges will need to clarify relationships between the exchange and other state 
agencies with jurisdiction over insurance issues.  Specifically, an exchange could be part of the 
state’s Department of Insurance or could be a separate entity.  
 
As it is currently written, ERISA precludes states from requiring employee benefit plans to 
purchase insurance through exchanges.  States may require individuals to do so, however, and 
may regulate insurers that sell their products through exchanges.  States may also require 
employers who do not offer health insurance to allow their employees to purchase insurance 
through exchanges with pre-tax dollars using section 125 arrangements.  To avoid ERISA 
challenges, employers will have to be careful to ensure that they are not perceived as “endorsing” 
such arrangements and should not offer discounts only to employees who purchase insurance 
through the exchange. 
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If states allow employee groups to participate in an insurance exchange as groups (i.e. if the 
employer contributes to or administers the arrangement), HIPAA will require that participating 
insurers provide insurance on a guaranteed offer and renewability basis.  HIPAA also prohibits 
discrimination in eligibility or premiums based on health status, and limits pre-existing 
conditions clauses for participating employee groups.  HIPAA would probably impose the same 
requirements for all employees of a particular employer if the employees purchase insurance 
through section 125 arrangements, even without employer contributions.  If a state requires 
community rating, guaranteed issue and renewal, and limits preexisting conditions clauses within 
the exchange, and thus, effectively applies HIPAA protections to all exchange participants, the 
state may avoid the issue of whether employees who participate in the plan under a section 125 
arrangement are independently protected by HIPAA. 
 
Congress could amend ERISA and HIPAA to clarify their requirements for insurance exchanges.  
It is possible that the Internal Revenue Service could, even in the absence of Congressional 
action, clarify whether or not the use of a section 125 arrangement automatically creates a group 
plan for HIPAA purposes. 
 
States could consider applying uniform regulation of underwriting, premiums, and benefits both 
inside and outside of insurance exchanges to avoid exposing exchanges to adverse selection or 
limiting the ability of exchanges to compete with insurers selling outside the exchange.  
Alternatively, states could only allow the purchase of insurance through the exchange in specific 
markets such as individual and/or small group. 
 
C.  Private Insurance Exchanges 
 
If neither Congress nor the states proceed with establishing insurance exchanges, exchanges 
could still be created by private entities or associations.  Congress could create a special antitrust 
exemption for private insurance exchanges.  The Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission could also clarify the status of exchanges through issuing an enforcement guideline.  
States may shield private exchanges from antitrust liability if the state explicitly authorizes and 
actively supervises the exchanges.  If the state does not do so, private exchanges should be 
prepared to limit themselves to 35% of the market and/or be able to offer procompetitive 
justifications for the restraints they impose on the market.   
 
Private exchanges should be aware that their membership and organizational rules will determine 
whether they are regulated primarily by the state or federal government.  Under the federal law 
governing MEWAs, “bona fide” employer association exchanges will be primarily regulated by 
ERISA, while other exchanges by the states.  Congress could, of course, expand the power of the 
states to comprehensively regulate all MEWAs or could extend federal authority over them. 
 
Since HIPAA could implicate private exchanges and the exchange of protected health 
information, Congress could amend HIPAA’s privacy rules to specifically clarify that they cover 
health insurance exchanges.  If Congress fails to amend HIPAA, exchanges could enter into 
business associate agreements with insurers to the extent that they will need to access health data 
on insureds.  To avoid legal challenges and to protect privacy, exchanges should not disclose 
personal health data to employers except to the extent permitted by HIPAA.  
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Conclusion 
 
Health insurance purchasing exchanges have been proposed as a possible means of making 
insurance more accessible, increasing competition among health plans, and promoting choice of 
insurer.  President Obama and congressional leaders have proposed establishing insurance 
exchanges through federal legislation.  There are no serious constitutional bars to Congress’ 
establishing an insurance exchange, although the Constitution might limit the means that 
Congress could use if it chose to implement an insurance exchange program through the states.  
Alternatively, Congress could amend a number of laws such as ERISA, HIPAA, and the antitrust 
laws to ease the creation of state or private purchasing exchanges.  Even in the absence of any 
congressional action, however, the creation of purchasing exchanges by the states or by private 
entities and associations are not likely to be precluded by legal considerations.  State and private 
purchasing exchanges do raise a number of important legal issues, however, that would need to 
be considered by any state or private entity creating an insurance exchange program.   
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